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RISK AND RESPONSIBILITY: STATE REGULATION AND 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER GENETIC 
TESTING INDUSTRY 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Does your DNA hold evidence of Native American ancestry? Are you 
likely to experience muscle pain while taking cholesterol-lowering drugs? 
Are you at an increased risk for developing Parkinson’s disease? Do you 
produce wet or dry earwax? Advances in genetic and medical science have 
led to the rise of the direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing industry, 
allowing people to discover answers to hundreds of such questions from the 
comfort of their homes. At a federal level, this industry remains largely 
unregulated, although there have been recent movements toward the 
imposition of new standards. In the meantime, states have been left to 
decide how to individually manage these new companies. Some states have 
no laws on this subject, permitting all kinds of DTC genetic testing, while 
others have effectively banned the DTC testing industry by imposing 
physician prescription requirements, laboratory licensing, informed consent 
requirements, and strict interpretations of the definition of “the practice of 
medicine.” DTC genetic test companies have taken varying approaches to 
this tangle of regulations, some changing their business models and others 
trying to find ways to circumvent these standards. 
Through enforcement actions consisting of cease and desist letters, 
grants of state licenses, threats of civil fines, and public awareness 
campaigns, states such as New York, Maryland, and California have been 
able to bring most DTC genetic testing companies into compliance with 
state laws and regulations. However, it appears some DTC testing 
companies are still not complying with laws in states that prohibit DTC 
testing “on the books” but have yet to undertake enforcement actions. Due 
to the lack of scientific understanding in the general public and the risks 
involved with sensitive medical information, some form of consumer 
protection is needed. In order to effectively regulate this industry, active 
enforcement mechanisms are necessary to help companies understand 
regulations and promote compliance. 
Part II of this paper describes the history and the present state of the 
DTC genetic testing industry, and lays out the advantages and 
disadvantages of this new technology. This section will also give a brief 
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overview of the current state of federal regulation.1 Part III will examine the 
various approaches states have taken in regard to this regulation problem. It 
will consider states that allow the DTC genetic testing industry to operate 
unregulated, as well as those states that impose restrictions such as 
physician prescribing, laboratory licensing, informed consent, and strict 
interpretations of the practice of medicine.2 Part IV will investigate those 
actions taken by states when DTC genetic test companies fail to comply with 
their laws.3 Part V will explore industry reaction to these enforcement 
actions.4 Finally, the analysis in Part VI will address what lessons can be 
learned from state attempts at regulation and what concepts should be 
included in the forthcoming implementation of federal regulations.5 
II.  BACKGROUND 
In the nearly 60 years since Watson and Crick discovered the structure 
of DNA, the science of genetics has advanced rapidly.6 However, it is only 
within the past decade that it has become practical to apply this newfound 
knowledge towards improvements in human health.7 With the completion of 
the Human Genome Project’s mapping of the genome in 2003,8 scientists 
have begun to unlock the relationships between the deviations in genetic 
sequences and disease.9 Variations in single base pairs, known as single 
nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs or snips), can be correlated with risks of 
certain diseases.10 While the conventional medical community has been 
slow to incorporate these discoveries into ordinary primary care, some 
entrepreneurs have decided to take advantage of this technology.11 They 
have bypassed physicians and marketed genetic tests to consumers over the 
 
 1. See infra Part II. 
 2. See infra Part III. 
 3. See infra Part IV. 
 4. See infra Part V. 
 5. See infra Part VI. 
 6. Genetics and Genomics Timeline, GENOME NEWS NETWORK (2004), http://www.ge 
nomenewsnetwork.org/resources/timeline/1953_Crick_Watson.php. 
 7. Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing and the Consequences to the Public: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 
111th Cong. 2 (2010) [hereinafter Shuren Statement] (statement of Jeffrey Shuren, Director, 
Center for Devices and Radiological Health, Food and Drug Administration). 
 8. Human Genome Project Information, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF SCI. (July 31, 
2012), http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/home.shtml. 
 9. See Shuren Statement, supra note 7, at 2. 
 10. SNP Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF SCI. (Sept. 19, 2008), 
http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/faq/snps.shtml. 
 11. See Pascal Borry et al., Where Are You Going, Where Have You Been: A Recent 
History of the Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Market, 1 J. COMMUNITY GENETICS 101, 
102 (2010). 
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internet.12 These DTC genetic tests have taken a number of forms, including 
tests that evaluate monogenic diseases, complex disease susceptibility, 
reactions to pharmaceuticals, nutrition, and ancestry.13 This market 
expanded rapidly, and by 2009 over 30 different DTC genetic test 
companies were in operation.14 Initially, it appeared the public was 
infatuated with the idea of taking control of its own health and unlocking the 
information contained within each genetic code.15 For example, the DTC 
genetic test company 23andMe was named the 2008 Time Invention of the 
Year.16 
However, scientists and regulators have begun to voice some concerns 
about the accuracy, public perception, and value of these tests.17 Most 
diseases are multifactorial, resulting from a combination of multiple genes 
and environmental factors rather than from a single mutation in a single 
gene.18 DTC genetic tests often report back with a category of risk of 
contracting a disease.19 However, risk is often defined in different ways, and 
such genetic tests are rarely conclusive.20 In 2006, the Federal Trade 
Commission noted that “having a particular gene doesn’t necessarily mean 
that a disease will develop; not having a particular gene doesn’t necessarily 
mean that the disease will not,”21 and warned consumers to interpret these 
tests with “a healthy dose of skepticism.”22 As Jessica Stransky of the genetic 
counseling program at the University of Maryland said, “‘That kind of 
information is pretty hard for the average person to interpret. . . . It gets 
more complicated with genetic traits that aren’t highly linked to certain 
conditions.’”23 Additionally, these tests estimate risk based on genetic factors 
 
 12. See id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See Timothy Caulfield & Amy L. McGuire, Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing: 
Perceptions, Problems and Policy Responses, 63 ANN. REV. MED. 23, 26 (2012). 
 16. Anita Hamilton, Best Inventions of 2008, The Retail DNA Test, TIME (Oct. 29, 2008), 
http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1852747_1854493_185411
3,00.html. 
 17. Caulfield & McGuire, supra note 15. 
 18. Jeanne Erdmann, Home Genetics Tests Are Called Unreliable, STL TODAY, March 23, 
2011, http://www.stltoday.com/lifestyles/health-med-fit/medical/home-genetics-tests-are-call 
ed-unreliable/article_cee6a092-0dc7-565e-b159-b53215f42ba1.html. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Jane E. Brody, Buyer Beware of at-Home Genetic Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2009, at 
D6. 
 22. Caulfield & McGuire, supra note 15, at 27. 
 23. Lisa Cleary, Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Debate, NBC WASH., Aug. 14, 
2011, http://www.nbcwashington.com/news/health/Direct-to-Consumer-Genetic-Testing-
Debate-112986579.html. 
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alone, ignoring the impact of environment, lifestyle, and family history.24 The 
American Medical Association (AMA) has warned that without the guidance 
of a physician or genetic counselor, test results could lead to 
misinterpretation, miscalculation of risks, and unwarranted lifestyle changes, 
or at the very least, money could be needlessly wasted on tests with little 
scientific value.25 
A 2010 report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) studied 
four major DTC genetic test companies and came to the conclusion that the 
tests are “misleading and of little or no practical use.”26 After submitting 
samples from the same donors to different companies, the investigators 
found a single person could be told he was at below average, average, and 
above average risk for a single disease, depending on which company was 
used.27 Another blow to the industry’s credibility occurred in June 2010, 
when a sample swap at 23andMe resulted in 96 customers receiving data 
that did not belong to them, leading to confusion, distress, and privacy 
concerns.28 In May 2010, Walgreens dropped its plan to sell Pathway 
Genomics over-the-counter kits in its stores upon investigative action by the 
FDA.29 These incidents have led to questions about the adequacy of the 
regulation of this industry.30 
Most of the calls for increased regulations come from those concerned 
about protecting consumers.31 Many commentators have been concerned 
that the results of DTC genetic tests can cause anxiety or lead to harmful 
behavior changes.32 Commentators are concerned consumers will either 
 
 24. Felix W. Frueh et al., The Future of Direct-to-Consumer Clinical Genetic Tests, 12 
NATURE REVS. GENETICS 511, 511 (2011). 
 25. Letter from Michael D. Maves, Exec. Vice President, Chief Exec. Officer, Am. Med. 
Ass’n to U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Feb. 23, 2011) (on file with Am. Med. Ass’n), available at 
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/399/consumer-genetic-testing-letter.pdf. 
 26. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-847T, DIRECT TO CONSUMER GENETIC 
TESTS: MISLEADING TEST RESULTS ARE FURTHER COMPLICATED BY DECEPTIVE MARKETING AND OTHER 
QUESTIONABLE PRACTICES 1 (2010). 
 27. Id. at i. 
 28. Daniel MacArthur, Sample Swaps at 23andMe: A Cautionary Tale, WIRED SCIENCE 
(June 7, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2010/06/Sample-swaps-at-
23andMe:-a-cautionary-tale. 
 29. Sherry Jacobson, Walgreens’ Dropping of Genetic Test Kits’ Relieves Experts, STL 
TODAY (May 17, 2010), http://www.stltoday.com/lifestyles/health-med-fit/medical/walgreens-
dropping-of-genetic-test-kits-relievesexperts/article_d75a363a-6aa5-59ab-815b-a24a12b 
a6002.html. 
 30. Caulfield & McGuire, supra note 15, at 27. 
 31. Id.; Maves, supra note 25. 
 32. Caulfield & McGuire, supra note 15, at 27. However, recent studies have suggested 
these concerns about stress and psychological harm from DTC genetic test results may have 
been over-stated. See Cinnamon Bloss et al., Effect of Direct-to-Consumer Genomewide 
Profiling to Assess Disease Risk, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 524, 529 (2011). 
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overreact to an increased risk of disease or gain a false sense of security 
from a report of a lowered risk.33 There is the potential danger of creating a 
population of the “worried well” who spend time and resources to deal with 
the results of their tests, which may only be grounded in weak science.34 
Adding to this confusion is the marketing strategies of many of these 
companies, which suggest that customers will be empowered to make 
informed and personalized healthcare and lifestyle decisions, implying more 
control over many of these diseases than science currently holds.35 There 
are also concerns that the results of these tests will spur people to make 
unnecessary appointments with physicians, increasing the burden of an 
already overworked healthcare system and exposing patients to the risk of 
iatrogenic harm.36 Finally, observers are also concerned about privacy risks 
and the uncontrolled disclosure of genetic information, given that neither 
traditional physician-patient confidentiality nor HIPAA standards necessarily 
apply.37 
The tort system seems incapable of effectively regulating this industry. 
This incapability is evidenced by only one major attempt at bringing a class-
action lawsuit against a DTC genetic test company. In Blumer v. Acu-Gen 
Biolabs, the plaintiffs brought a products liability action against the 
manufacturer of the Baby Gender Mentor Kit, which was advertised to 
determine the gender of a fetus through genetic analysis of maternal blood 
samples with a 99% degree of accuracy.38 The plaintiffs brought claims 
under false advertising, consequential damages, failure to provide the 
guaranteed refund, and infliction of emotional distress.39 However, when 
Acu-Gen was dissolved in 2010, the case was no longer financially viable 
and the plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss without prejudice.40 This has left 
the legal community with doubts as to the viability of using lawsuits to keep 
the DTC genetic test industry in check. The ability to bring lawsuits in the first 
place can be dubious, due to the cost, time, and effort needed. Additionally, 
any lawsuit in this highly technical area is likely to come down to a “battle of 
the experts” and potentially result in a Daubert hearing over the validity of 
 
 33. Caulfield & McGuire, supra note 15, at 27. 
 34. Frueh et al., supra note 24, at 511. 
 35. See Caulfield & McGuire, supra note 15, at 24. 
 36. Id. at 29. Iatrogenic harm is defined as “injury caused by doctors and health care 
institutions.” BARRY FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 41 (6th ed. 
2008). 
 37. Caulfield & McGuire, supra note 15, at 29. 
 38. Blumer v. Acu-Gen Biolabs, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 2d 81, 83, 84 (D. Mass. 2009). 
 39. Id. at 83. 
 40. Annmarie Giblin, Direct to Consumer Genetic Testing: A Pandora’s Box of Potential 
Litigation, DRI TODAY, Sept. 5, 2011, http://dritoday.org/feature.aspx?id=67. 
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the mostly unsettled science behind the genetic tests.41 Finally, in cases such 
as Blumer where no final resolution is reached, no rule of law emerges by 
which others in the industry can be regulated. 
Some may argue that if these tests are truly without credibility, they will 
go the way of “snake oil” treatments of the past, and disappear due to 
market forces.42 While this may be the eventual outcome for the more shady 
and unreliable members of this industry, they should not be permitted to 
mislead and harm uninformed consumers in the meantime. Others may 
claim that the responsibility should fall to consumers to be adequately 
informed before ordering a test kit, and that the customers should shoulder 
the risk of being misled. However, this industry is vastly different from 
traditional consumer purchasing agreements of the past, presenting new 
challenges.43 This is a highly technical field relying almost entirely on 
cutting-edge science.44 As a result of the young age of this science, many of 
those who are purchasing DTC genetic tests likely received very little 
education in genetics. There is a gross imbalance between the level of 
understanding of the general public and those who are marketing genetic 
tests with all kinds of hopeful promises.45 As a result, consumers are placing 
a large amount of trust in the results they receive from their genetic tests. 
Some form of government regulation is needed to help stabilize this 
imbalance in knowledge and understanding. 
It has been difficult to “determine the most appropriate way to regulate 
a product that has multiple purposes, that is sold to consumers 
internationally and over the internet, and that has been found by federal 
investigation to have questionable validity and unproven utility.”46 Currently, 
DTC genetic tests fall within a grey area of federal regulation.47 Both the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and the Federal Food 
 
 41. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). A Daubert 
challenge is a hearing held before the beginning of trial at which the admissibility of expert 
testimony is decided. Id. at 582. Courts look to a number of factors, including whether the 
scientific theory has been tested, if it has been subjected to peer review and publication, its 
error rate, standards controlling its application, and its general acceptance in the scientific 
community. Id. at 593-94. Since the algorithms used to test SNPs are rapidly evolving, it is 
unlikely there would be a consensus in the scientific community, leading to protracted battles 
at trial between experts with opposing opinions. See Shuren Statement, supra note 7, at 7-8. 
 42. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 47, 98-112 
(1982). 
 43. See Caulfield & McGuire, supra note 15, at 30. 
 44. See id. at 27. 
 45. See Kishore, Test at Your Own Risk: Your Genetic Report Card and the Direct-to-
Consumer Duty to Secure Informed Consent, 59 EMORY L.J. 1553, 1588 (2010). 
 46. Caulfield & McGuire, supra note 15, at 24. 
 47. Meredith Wadman, Gene-Testing Firms Face Legal Battle, 453 NATURE 1148, 1148 
(2008). 
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and Drug Administration (FDA) share in responsibility for regulating this 
industry.48 CMS is responsible for overseeing all tests developed and 
performed in-house, known as laboratory developed tests (LDTs).49 The FDA 
regulates tests that are marketed as medical devices.50 Under § 201(h) of 
the Federal Food and Drug Cosmetic Act, a device is defined as any 
instrument that is “intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other 
conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease.”51 
Typically, a test kit that bundles components and is labeled for a particular 
use is referred to as an in vitro diagnostic test (IVD), which is a medical 
device that cannot be marketed without FDA approval.52 However, most 
genetic tests are not sold as kits, but rather the tests are performed in-house 
on samples sent in by mail.53 As a result, they are classified as LDTs that are 
not subject to FDA oversight or even strict scrutiny by CMS.54 As long as a 
laboratory meets minimum quality controls under Clinical Laboratory 
Improvement Amendments (CLIA), there are no accuracy reviews and no 
mandatory proficiency testing.55 
However, there has been a lot of movement towards increasing federal 
oversight of this industry. In 2008, the FDA published guidelines on 
regulating medical devices known as In Vitro Diagnostic Multivariate Assays 
(IVDMIAs), a particular class of LDTs, which encompasses some genetic 
tests.56 The FDA intends to begin regulating this particular class of tests 
because they are more intricate and carry greater risks than other more 
traditional LDTs.57 On July 22, 2010, the House of Representatives’ 
Subcommittee on the Oversight and Investigations on Energy and 
Commerce held a public hearing entitled “Direct-to-Consumer Genetic 
Testing and the Consequences to the Public Health.”58 In March 2011, the 
FDA’s molecular and genetics group held a meeting to discuss DTC genetic 
 
 48. Dianne Bourque et al., Issues and Trends in the Regulation of Genetic Testing, 
LEXISNEXIS EMERGING ISSUES ANALYSIS, Apr. 2009, at 3, available at 2009 Emerging Issues 
3537. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h)(2) (2006). 
 52. Bourque et al., supra note 48, at 6. 
 53. Id. at 4. 
 54. Id. at 4, 8. 
 55. Id. at 4. 
 56. Id. at 8. 
 57. Bourque et al., supra note 48, at 8. 
 58. Giblin, supra note 40. The hearing examined the sale of DTC personal genetic tests 
and included testimony from the GAO, FDA, academia, and industry. Direct-to-Consumer 
Genetic Testing and the Consequences to the Public: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 111th Cong. (2010). 
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testing.59 Between May 10, 2010 and May 11, 2011, the FDA sent letters to 
manufacturers of DTC genetic tests, advising them they appeared to be 
selling medical devices and therefore needed FDA clearance.60 As a result, 
many testing companies are left confused by this tangle of federal 
regulations, unsure of whether their test requires CLIA certification under 
CMS, FDA approval, or both, and are left trying to anticipate what future 
federal regulations may require of them.61 
In the meantime, the responsibility of regulation has fallen to the states. 
They have been left to their own devices in deciding how to manage this 
new industry. The director of the Genetics and Public Policy Center stated, 
“‘In the absence of federal leadership on genetic testing oversight, it is not 
surprising that the states are stepping in.’”62 The result is a complex and 
diverse set of regulations that vary widely between states.63 While trying to 
serve their national customer base, DTC genetic test companies are faced 
with the task of complying with unique regulations and requirements in each 
state in order to avoid penalties. 
III.  STATE LAWS 
Through CLIA, all states have the authority to regulate genetic testing 
laboratories.64 CLIA designates that patient tests must be requested by an 
authorized person, and an “[a]uthorized person means an individual 
authorized under State law to order tests or receive test results, or both.”65 
Therefore, the definition of an authorized person varies between states. As a 
result, the law “‘is very inconsistent from state to state at a time when the 
risks to consumers do not vary state to state — and when we have 
businesses that are certainly operating state to state.’“66 Twenty-three states 
do not have any statutes addressing DTC testing, meaning there is no 
 
 59. Giblin, supra note 40. This was a non-voting panel meeting held to discuss and make 
recommendations on scientific issues concerning DTC genetic tests that make medical claims. 
Summary from the Molecular & Clinical Genetics Panel Meeting – March 8 & 9, 2011, DEP’T 
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.genomicslawreport.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/ 
03/FDA-DTC-Advisory-Panel-Meeting-Summary.pdf. 
 60. Giblin, supra note 40. 
 61. See id. 
 62. Turna Ray, Will Other States Follow NY, Calif., in Taking on DTC Genetic-Testing 
Firms?, GENOMEWEB, PHARMACOGENOMICS REPORTER (June 25, 2008), http://www.ge 
nomeweb.com/dxpgx/will-other-states-follow-ny-calif-taking-dtc-genetic-testing-firms-0. 
 63. See generally GENETICS & PUB. POLICY CTR., JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV., SURVEY OF DIRECT-
TO-CONSUMER TESTING STATUTES AND REGULATIONS, BERMAN INSTITUTE OF BIOETHICS (2007) 
(demonstrating the variety of direct to consumer regulations among the states). 
 64. Borque et al., supra note 48, at 9-10. 
 65. 42 C.F.R. § 493.2 (2011). 
 66. Wadman, supra note 47, at 1149. 
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regulation or limitations on the industry’s ability to market their product to 
consumers.67 Fifteen states have statutes that effectively ban the DTC genetic 
test industry, through the use of a variety of physician ordering requirements, 
laboratory licensing, informed consent, and scope of the definition of “the 
practice of medicine.”68 Other states are situated between these extremes, 
limiting the types of DTC tests available or specifying certifications that must 
be obtained before tests can be marketed to consumers.69 This results in a 
highly fragmented and complex regulatory picture for any DTC genetic test 
company hoping to market its services nationwide. 
A. States Actively Permitting DTC Genetic Tests 
A small number of states have statutes or regulations permitting DTC 
genetic testing, meaning they are direct-access states.70 For example, 
Virginia state law not only allows patients to order tests and receive results, it 
also provides some protection for physicians who fail to act on the results of 
a test that they themselves did not order, or results of a test that were not 
brought to them for consultation.71 Virginia law also provides that when a 
test is requested without the authorization of a physician, the results shall be 
reported to the person who was the subject of the test.72 The results need to 
include a statement in bold type that it is the responsibility of the test subject 
to “arrange with his physician for consultation and interpretation of the 
results.”73 Virginia not only allows direct-to-consumer genetic tests, but has 
also taken steps to ensure that physicians and healthcare providers are not 
harmed by the existence of the industry. Rather than trying to restrict the 
industry, Virginia has taken action to accommodate it. 
B. States that are Silent 
Twenty-three states are simply silent on the issue, having no statutes or 
regulations addressing the permissibility of patient-ordered genetic tests.74 
These are also typically direct-access states.75 Silence by state legislatures 
allows DTC testing companies to directly market genetic tests to consumers 
 
 67. GENETICS & PUB. POLICY CTR., supra note 63, at 1-2, 4-5, 7, 9-13. 
 68. Id. at 1-9, 11-12, 14. 
 69. Id. at 1, 3-4, 6, 8-10. 
 70. Id. at 2, 8, 10, 13. 
 71. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.18 (2006). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. GENETICS & PUB. POLICY CTR., supra note 63, at 1-2, 4-5, 7-13. These states are 
Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and West Virginia. Id. 
 75. Id. 
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without the need for an order by a physician or any other learned 
intermediary.76 Also, these states do not impose strict state laboratory 
licensing or informed consent requirements.77 Through their silence, these 
states imply that DTC genetic tests do not fall within their state definitions of 
the unlawful practice of medicine. However, in the absence of legislation, 
these states could still choose to begin regulating the DTC industry through 
changes in common law, agency policy, or through a different interpretation 
of their definition of the practice of medicine. 
States such as Montana, Missouri, Vermont, and West Virginia have no 
laws relating to authorization to order genetic tests.78 Nebraska law is silent 
on authority to order genetic tests, however it attempts to impose a written 
informed consent requirement on those who order predictive genetic tests 
through a physician.79 Yet, if a patient directly orders the test himself, 
informed consent is not required.80 
Some states authorize the DTC genetic testing industry implicitly by not 
including these tests within their definition of the “practice of medicine.”81 
Under Colorado law, the practice of medicine does not include provision of 
laboratory tests to patients in a CLIA certified laboratory.82 Therefore 
Colorado imposes no licensing requirements and permits DTC genetic 
testing.83 In Utah, the practice of medicine is defined as “to diagnose, treat, 
correct, administer anesthesia, or prescribe . . . by an individual in Utah or 
outside the state upon or for any human within the state.”84 However, DTC 
genetic tests are not viewed as being diagnostic, as an internal legal opinion 
from the Utah Department of Health holds that ordering a test, performing 
the test, and delivering the results does not constitute the “practice of 
medicine.”85 
Through passive silence, these direct access states provide minimal 
regulation of the DTC genetic testing industry. This wide latitude given to the 
industry provides for freedom to access genetic information, but does not 
offer consumers any protection against potentially misleading results. These 
states place the responsibility of being actively informed participants upon 
 
 76. “Learned intermediary” is defined as a person in the chain of distribution between the 
manufacturer and consumer, who is aware of the risks of the product and has the 
responsibility to inform the end-user. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 890, 970 (9th ed. 2009). 
 77. GENETICS & PUB. POLICY CTR., supra note 63, at 1-2, 4-5, 7-13. 
 78. Id. at 7, 12, 13. 
 79. NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-551 (2011). 
 80. GENETICS & PUB. POLICY CTR., supra note 63, at 8. 
 81. See id. at 1-2, 12. 
 82. COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-36-106(3)(u) (2011). 
 83. GENETICS & PUB. POLICY CTR., supra note 63, at 2. 
 84. UTAH CODE § 58-67-102 (2012). 
 85. GENETICS & PUB. POLICY CTR., supra note 63, at 12. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2012] RISK AND RESPONSIBILITY 177 
the shoulders of consumers who wish to know more about their genetic 
makeup. 
C. States Prohibiting DTC Genetic Tests 
Fifteen states have statutes and regulations in place that effectively ban 
the DTC genetic testing industry.86 These states prohibit DTC genetic testing 
in a variety of ways, such as limiting the authorization to order medical tests 
and receive results, laboratory licensing, imposing informed consent 
requirements, and the scope of definition of the practice of medicine.87 
1. Authorization to Order Medical Tests 
The simplest way to regulate the DTC testing industry is through statutes 
or regulations controlling the authority to request clinical laboratory tests. By 
altering the definition of an authorized person, states can effectively prevent 
companies from providing services to consumers without the participation of 
a physician or other qualified personnel. 
California law spells out specific tests that may be requested by any 
person without the need of a physician.88 These include “pregnancy, 
glucose level, cholesterol, occult blood, and any other for which there is a 
test for a particular analyte approved by the FDA for sale to the public 
without a prescription, in the form of an over-the-counter test kit.”89 This list 
does not include genetics tests, meaning any orders from a DTC genetic 
testing company in California must go through a physician.90 
New York also prohibits marketing genetic tests directly to consumers.91 
New York regulations state “a clinical laboratory shall examine specimens 
only at the request of licensed physicians or other persons authorized by law 
to use the findings of laboratory examinations in their practice or the 
performance of their official duties.”92 Other authorized persons who can 
request examination of specimens include dentists, podiatrists, chiropractors, 
physician’s assistants, licensed midwives, nurse practitioners, police officers, 
and judges.93 Additionally, New York prohibits laboratories from reporting 
the results directly to the patient: 
 
 86. Id. at 1-9, 11-12, 14. These states are Alabama, California, Connecticut, Georgia, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Wyoming. Id. 
 87. See Ray, Will Other States Follow NY, Calif., in Taking on DTC Genetic-Testing 
Firms?, supra note 62. 
 88. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 1246.5 (West 2012). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. GENETICS & PUB. POLICY CTR., supra note 63, at 9-10. 
 92. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 58-1.7(b) (2012). 
 93. Id. § 58-1.7(b)(2). 
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No person shall report the result of any test, examination or analysis of a 
specimen submitted for evidence of human disease or medical condition 
except to a physician, his agent, or other person authorized by law to 
employ the results thereof in the conduct of his practice or in the fulfillment 
of his official duties. Reports shall not be issued to the patients concerned 
except with the written consent of the physician or other authorized person.94 
Maryland has also limited the use of DTC genetic tests, despite claiming 
to be “the state for progressive bioscience development.”95 State regulations 
provide that a laboratory may not perform a test without authorization from 
a court of law, doctor, or other authorized person such as a midwife, nurse 
practitioner, physician’s assistant, chiropractor, or employer requesting a 
job-related drug or alcohol test.96 Further, a laboratory may not release the 
test results to patients, nor to anyone other than the authorized person.97 
There is an exception for certain health awareness tests, approved by the 
Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene and performed at a temporary 
laboratory, which may be provided directly to consumers.98 However, 
genetic tests do not qualify under this exception.99 
Massachusetts law restricts the ordering of medical tests and receipt of 
results to doctors and other authorized people; however, there is a large 
exception for those tests that promote “health awareness and education 
among the general public by early detection of disease and/or associated 
risk factors.”100 These tests that fall under the exemption are not going to be 
used “for the purpose of providing clinical diagnosis or treatment to 
patients.”101 As a result direct-to-consumer marketing is permitted for eight 
types of tests including pregnancy and cholesterol, but not genetics.102 
2. Laboratory Licensing 
Through their police power, states have the authority to license the 
healthcare industry.103 Licenses are used to enforce disciplinary actions, 
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regulate the scope of services, and prevent unqualified people from 
attempting to provide services to the public.104 
California law requires all laboratories performing these genetic tests to 
undergo evaluation of accuracy and medical utility,105 and also imposes 
licensing requirements upon the scientists performing the tests.106 California 
regulations state that “[a] clinical laboratory performing clinical laboratory 
tests or examinations classified as of moderate or of high complexity under 
CLIA107 shall obtain a clinical laboratory license.”108 Also, “it is unlawful for 
any person to own, operate, maintain, direct or engage in the business of 
operating a clinical laboratory . . . unless he or she possesses a valid 
clinical laboratory license issued by the department,”109 and 
no person may solicit or accept any biological specimen for clinical 
laboratory testing or examination unless there is in effect for the clinical 
laboratory where the test or examination is to be performed a license . . ., 
and the person performing the test or examination is authorized to perform 
the test or examination.110 
There is also a provision that allows the Department of Public Health to 
retain the ability to 
not issue a license or registration until it is satisfied that the clinical 
laboratory will be operated within the spirit and intent of this chapter, that 
the owners and laboratory directors are each of good moral character, and 
that the granting of the license will not be in conflict with the interests of 
public health.111 
This adds a subjective element to the California licensing scheme, which 
encourages DTC genetic testing companies to make good faith efforts to 
comply with state laws, or risk not being granted a license in the future. 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. Robert Langreth, California orders stop to gene testing, FORBES (June 14, 2008), 
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New York’s Clinical Laboratory Evaluation Program (CLEP) is at least as 
stringent as CLIA, imposing stricter requirements on laboratories operating 
within the state, and giving New York CLIA-exempt status.112 New York 
requires evidence of both the analytical and clinical validity of all tests, 
approval of all tests before they can be marketed (including ones not subject 
to FDA approval), and biennial laboratory inspections.113 New York 
regulations also require a clinical laboratory to have a permit before it can 
solicit and accept specimens for the purpose of diagnosis, prevention, or 
treatment of a disease, or the assessment of a health condition.114 As a 
result of the requirement that all laboratories soliciting samples from New 
York residents are required to obtain this license, nearly 75% of all cytogenic 
and genetic tests in the United States are subject to CLEP.115 
Maryland regulations also establish quality assurance standards for 
licensed laboratories, including criteria such as effective supervision, quality 
control, and safety procedures.116 Additionally, Maryland prohibits 
physicians from sending specimens to laboratories that are not licensed 
within the state.117 Specifically, genetic testing laboratories must provide 
written verification from the laboratory director that direct-to-consumer 
specimens will not be accepted from Maryland, nor will testing be 
performed on such specimens.118 
3. Informed Consent Requirements 
In addition to physician ordering and laboratory licensing, states can 
also regulate the genetic testing industry by implementing conditions of 
informed consent. These regulations can easily be tailored to meet the 
concerns of individual states, and are directly aimed at ensuring each 
individual consumer has a meaningful understanding of the risks and 
benefits of the test. 
New York law specifies informed consent requirements for genetic 
tests.119 The laboratory must provide a statement of the purpose of the test, 
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a description of the disease or condition being tested for, the level of 
certainty that a positive result serves as a predictor for the disease, and the 
name of persons to whom the results can be disclosed.120 However, most 
often laboratories simply enclose a consent form with the kit.121 This usually 
fails to satisfy the legally-sufficient requirement of a meaningful discussion 
between provider and patient, and exposes the offending company to risk of 
a civil fine.122 
Michigan also imposes informed consent requirements for genetic 
tests.123 The law requires that “a physician or an individual to whom the 
physician has delegated authority . . . shall not order a presymptomatic or 
predictive genetic test without first obtaining the written, informed consent of 
the test subject.”124 This is another way to ensure that ordering of a genetic 
test occurs through a physician and that the subject is aware of the potential 
benefits and harms of undergoing the test. 
4. The Practice of Medicine 
Even without laws specifically authorizing persons to order clinical tests, 
states can regulate the DTC industry through their interpretation of the 
definition of the practice of medicine. Traditionally, states have regulated the 
practice of medicine through their police power, and no one seriously 
questions their ability to promote regulations for the protection of the public 
health.125 State medical practice acts prohibit anyone but licensed 
professionals from engaging in the practice of medicine.126 The state 
medical board has primary responsibility for preventing the unauthorized 
practice of medicine by imposing criminal sanctions and revoking the 
licenses of any physicians who aid the unlicensed practitioner.127 Definitions 
of the practice of medicine vary from state to state, but most include 
diagnosis, prescribing, and surgical interventions.128 These variations reflect 
historical and political factors, as well as differences in attitudes and 
ideologies.129 
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 121. Id. at 14. 
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Some DTC genetic test companies claim that they only provide 
information on health-related predispositions, and are not involved in 
diagnosis, giving medical advice, or the practice of medicine. For example, 
Mari Baker, the chief executive of Navigenics stated that the test “‘doesn’t 
say you have a disease,’ . . . ‘it says you carry a genetic predisposition for 
the disease and should talk with a health care professional.’“130 However, 
some disagree. They see the provision of information regarding probabilities 
of severe disease or other health conditions as the practice of medicine. 
Moreover, they point out that some DTC genetic test company 
advertisements claim to empower customers to make informed decisions 
about their health, seemingly emphasizing the medical purpose of the 
tests.131 The AMA is of the position that results that are presented as an 
increase or decrease in risk of a condition are diagnostic, and should be 
prohibited as the unauthorized practice of medicine.132 
Deciding whether or not DTC genetic tests are the practice of medicine 
has proved to be difficult. For example, most agree that tests for ancestry do 
not constitute the practice of medicine, while single-gene determinative tests 
such as those for Huntington’s disease do.133 However, many traits that are 
screened for in these tests involve multiple genes and environmental factors, 
and result in only increased or decreased probabilities of susceptibility.134 
The difficulty lies in determining where along this spectrum DTC genetic 
testing companies cross over into the unauthorized practice of medicine. In 
June 2008, California, along with New York and Maryland, determined that 
use of genetic tests in performing risk assessments fell within the scope of 
state regulation.135 
In New York, the practice of medicine is defined as “diagnosing, 
treating, operating or prescribing for any human disease, pain, injury, 
deformity or physical condition.”136 In regards to DTC genetic tests, a 
director from the New York State Department of Health stated, “We think if 
you’re telling people you have increased risk of adverse health effects, that’s 
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medical advice.“137 In California, the unlawful practice of medicine involves 
any unlicensed person who practices “any system or mode of treating the 
sick or afflicted in this state, or who diagnoses, treats, operates for or 
prescribes for any ailment, blemish, deformity, disease, disfigurement, 
disorder, injury, or other physical or mental condition of any person.”138 It 
appears that like New York, California believes that DTC genetic tests 
diagnose disorders or physical conditions. In Maryland the “practice of 
medicine” means “to engage, with or without compensation, in medical 
diagnosis, healing, treatment, or surgery” and includes “diagnosing, 
healing, treating, preventing, prescribing for, or removing any physical, 
mental, emotional ailment or supposed ailment of an individual by . . . 
appliance, test, drug, operation or treatment.”139 This definition specifically 
includes the uses of tests within the practice of medicine, seemingly 
encompassing DTC genetic tests. Massachusetts’ most recent proposed 
regulations provide that the practice of medicine involves: 
conduct, the purpose or reasonably foreseeable effect of which is to 
encourage the reliance of another person upon an individual’s knowledge 
or skill in the maintenance of human health by the prevention, alleviation or 
cure of disease . . . or reasonably thought to involve an assumption of 
responsibility for the other person’s physical or mental well being: diagnosis, 
treatment, use of instruments or other devices . . . .140 
This definition is different from the others in that it focuses on the 
relationship between patient and practitioner. This kind of reliance is readily 
apparent in the DTC genetic testing model. Michigan directly bans DTC 
genetic tests through its definition of the practice of medicine,141 which 
means the “diagnosis, treatment, prevention, cure or relieving of a human 
disease, . . . by . . . device, diagnostic test, or other means, or offering, 
undertaking attempting to do, or holding oneself out as able to do, any of 
these acts.”142 According to an official with the Michigan Department of 
Community Health, ordering and receiving tests is considered the practice of 
medicine, and therefore DTC genetic testing is banned.143 
Even though some of these definitions do not appear to be obviously 
different from those in direct access states, they serve as one of the available 
tools states can use to impose regulations on the DTC genetic testing 
industry. In general, it appears the distinction can be found in whether or 
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not states view DTC genetic tests as involved in diagnosis, and therefore are 
included within the definition of the unlawful practice of medicine. 
IV.  STATE ACTIONS 
Despite all of the laws and regulations outlined above, many DTC 
genetic testing companies initially offered their services in every state, 
without physician prescriptions, state laboratory licenses, or proper informed 
consent.144 It took the rapid growth of the industry and a number of 
consumer complaints to draw attention to the violations.145 In the absence 
of federal regulations, the states took action. In 2008, some of the states 
that had decided to ban DTC genetic testing began to investigate the 
compliance of online companies with their laws and regulations.146 When 
they found companies in violation of their statutes and regulations, these 
states took steps to bring the industry into compliance, including sending 
cease and desist letters, threatening civil fines, and raising public awareness 
of the violations.147 They also began the process of issuing state laboratory 
licenses to those able to meet applicable standards.148 States such as New 
York and California have been fairly successful in bringing most personal 
genomics services into line.149 In the three years following this flurry of 
enforcement by the states, there have been few major actions undertaken in 
furtherance of the regulation of the DTC genetic testing industry.150 
A. Cease and Desist Letters 
In June 2008, the California Department of Public Health sent cease 
and desist letters to 16 genetic testing companies, including industry leaders 
23andMe, deCODEme and Navigenics, notifying them of violations of state 
laws and ordering them to stop testing until they provided proof of 
compliance.151 These letters were sent as a result of an investigation 
prompted by a number of consumer complaints about the accuracy and 
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affordability of the tests.152 California’s chief of Laboratory Field Services, 
Karen Nickel, stated, “‘We [are] no longer tolerating direct-to-consumer 
genetic testing in California.’”153 She said, “These businesses are apparently 
operating without a clinical laboratory license in California. The genetic tests 
have not been validated for clinical utility and accuracy, and they are 
scaring a lot of people to death.’“154 The letters pointed out defects of both 
failing to have a license to conduct laboratory testing in the state and 
offering genetic tests to California residents without a physician’s order.155 
The targeted companies were given two weeks to submit a plan of how they 
intended to “‘prevent further violation of California state laboratory law.’“156 
At the June 23, 2008 deadline, only one company had announced it 
would stop marketing its services in California and direct its customers to 
order the genetic tests through a physician.157 23andMe and Navigenics 
both stated that they believed they were already complying with all 
California laws and would not change their operations.158 At the time, both 
companies sub-contracted with California-certified laboratories to perform 
the genome scans,159 however, the companies performed their own analysis 
of the genetic data without state licenses.160 Also, both companies employed 
California-licensed physicians to order the genetic tests on behalf of 
customers, apparently satisfying California’s physician prescription 
requirements.161 However, as pointed out by Dr. Kathy Hudson of Johns 
Hopkins University, the personal physician relationship called for by state 
regulations is vastly different from a prescription ordered by “some doc on 
the payroll at Genes R Us.”162 Although California has questioned the extent 
of physician involvement in ordering, it appears that at least for the moment, 
a staff physician is sufficient.163 
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deCODEme’s response was to suggest that California sent them a cease 
and desist letter in error because they did not market directly to Californian 
consumers.164 deCODEme’s Chief Scientific Officer stated that the company 
would not offer its tests to California residents until it received a state 
license, and even then, the tests would only be offered through 
physicians.165 However, deCODEme continued to offer its ancestry services 
in every state including California, since they believed this type of test was 
not included in the definition of diagnostic testing.166 
The New York State Department of Health sent similar cease and desist 
letters to 26 companies between November 2007 and June 2008.167 
Navigenics placed its New York customers on a waiting list until its sub-
contracted laboratory Affymetrix received a New York license.168 Both 
Navigenics’ and 23andMe’s sub-contracted laboratories also received 
warning letters from New York.169 These letters were effective, as evidenced 
by the very few personal genomics companies currently operating within the 
state.170 
B. Licensing 
Licensing of laboratories is another tool states can use to encourage 
compliance. It can be used as a stick to impose sanctions on companies 
who refuse to cooperate, but can also be a carrot used to entice companies 
to comply. Earning a state license can serve as proof of the legitimacy and 
quality of a company’s business and scientific claims, and offer a 
competitive advantage over others in the industry. 
In order to earn a California license, a laboratory must address the 
intended use and purpose of the test, the patient population, and provide 
methodology and samples that can be used to validate their procedures.171 
In particular, the accuracy and precision of the algorithm needs to be 
validated by the Department of Public Health.172 In August 2008, California 
granted Navigenics and 23andMe laboratory licenses after a review found 
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their genetic analysis procedures were based on valid, current scientific 
literature.173 As of June 2010, 15 laboratories using DTC genetic algorithms 
were licensed to operate in California.174 
An application for a New York Laboratory Permit involves disclosure of 
materials and methods, interpretation of results, and validation studies.175 
The application form also states that consent forms must comply with the 
Genetic Testing Confidentiality Law Art. 7, § 79-l.176 Each consent form 
must be disease-specific, and laboratories should have a policy in place to 
ensure the patient agrees to each test requested.177 In 2010, Navigenics 
became the first personal genomics service to receive a state laboratory 
license from New York, and because their business model already required 
physician ordering, they are one of the few companies legally able to offer 
their genetic testing services in that state.178 
C. Civil Fines 
Accompanying California’s cease and desist letters were threats of civil 
and criminal sanctions.179 Under California law, each company in question 
was facing fines of up to $3,000 per day or per violation if there was no 
immediate jeopardy to California residents, and fines from $3,050 to 
$10,000 per day or per violation if immediate jeopardy was present.180 
Additionally, California had the possibility of imposing onsite monitoring as 
defined under CLIA,181 as well as imposing the cost of the onsite monitoring 
on the offending company.182 In New York, a violation of owning or 
operating a clinical laboratory without a valid permit can result in a civil 
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penalty of up to $2,000 per day.183 Apparently the threat of substantial 
monetary sanctions was significant enough to quickly bring most of the 
targeted companies into compliance with state laws. 
The use of company-employed physicians to rubber stamp consumer 
orders is another area where civil fines could play a role in enforcement. If 
states are unhappy with the practice of using company physicians to satisfy 
the physician prescription requirement, they may take actions similar to 
those in enforcement regarding telemedicine. Like DTC genetic tests, the 
telemedicine industry does not easily recognize state boundaries.184 As a 
result, many states adopted specific statutes relating to the practice of 
telemedicine.185 For example, a California statue imposes a fine of up to 
$25,000 against the physicians themselves for each episode of prescribing 
dangerous drugs without an appropriate prior examination and medical 
indication.186 States who would like to prohibit a DTC genetic company 
from employing its own physicians in order to more fully satisfy the 
physician-prescription requirements may choose to enact similar statues to 
penalize those physicians who order genetic tests without a good faith 
examination or a true face to face doctor-patient relationship. 
D. Public Awareness 
Public awareness about the DTC genetic testing industry has grown 
immensely in recent years, and is another available tool states can use to 
pressure companies into compliance. For example, the distribution of the 
cease and desist letters by both California and New York were widely 
publicized in the media.187 In March 2011, Maryland’s Attorney General 
posted an online letter entitled “At-Home Genetic Tests: Proceed with 
Caution.”188 It warned Maryland residents to consult their physician before 
and after a test, and that “no at-home genetic test has been reviewed or has 
had their claims evaluated for accuracy by the FDA.”189 If the residents of a 
state are aware a DTC genetic testing company is continuing to flirt with 
violations of state law, customers will become wary and business in that 
state will surely decline. 
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 185. Id. 
 186. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2242.1 (West 2012). 
 187. See, e.g., Pollack, Gene Testing Questioned by Regulators, supra note 130; Brody, 
supra note 21; Langreth, supra note 105. 
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V.  INDUSTRY REACTION AND CURRENT PRACTICE 
DTC genetic testing companies have had varying reactions to the 
implementation and enforcement of state regulations. Some have altered 
their national business models to ensure compliance in the most stringent 
states, some have varied their practices between states, and others have 
forged ahead, only nominally claiming to adhere to the applicable 
standards. 
A. Navigenics190 
On July 27, 2010, California-based Navigenics issued a press release 
in response to federal regulatory meetings indicating a willingness to work 
with authorities.191 Navigenics’ CEO testified at the House of 
Representatives’ hearing on “Direct-To-Consumer Genetic Testing and the 
Consequences to the Public Health.”192 The statement recognized the 
variation in practice between genetic testing companies, claiming that 
Navigenics has taken a very conservative approach and has been in 
constant contact with the FDA.193 In addition, Navigenics received a state 
license from the State of California’s Department of Public Health in 
2008,194 a clinical laboratory permit from the New York State Department 
of Health in January 2010,195 and is the only personal genomics company 
with approval to operate in all 50 states.196 
 
 190. Subsequent to the submission of this article, Navigenics underwent a significant 
change. Their homepage currently reads: “Navigenics was recently acquired by Life 
Technologies, a global biotechnology company dedicated to innovation and improving life in 
meaningful ways. . . . We are no longer accepting orders or samples for the Navigenics 
Health Compass service.” Our acquisition by Life Technologies, NAVIGENICS (2012), 
http://www.navigenics.com/. The Frequently Asked Questions Page states “[a]s of August 3, 
2012, we will not be accepting new orders going forward.” Your questions answered, 
NAVIGENICS (2012), http://www.navigenics.com/visitor/about_us/acquisition_faqs//. As a 
result, many of the following citations no longer exist on the Navigenics website; however they 
remain on file with the author as noted. 
 191. Press Release, Navigenics Statement, NAVIGENICS (July 27, 2010), available at 
http://www.navigenics.com/visitor/about_us/press/releases/statement_072710/ (on file with 
author). 
 192. Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing and the Consequences to the Public: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 
111th Cong. (2010) [hereinafter Vanier Testimony] (testimony of Vance Vanier, Chief 
Executive Officer, Navigenics, Inc.). 
 193. Id. at 3-4. 
 194. NAVIGENICS, The Navigator, Working Closely with Regulators – A Navigenics Core 
Principle, supra note 178. 
 195. Id. 
 196. NAVIGENICS, Press Release, Navigenics Statement, supra note 191. 
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Upon the launch of the Navigenics Health Compass services in 2008, 
the company released a ten point list of model standards for the personal 
genomics industry.197 These standards include validity, accuracy, clinical 
relevance,198 actionability, access to genetic counseling, security and 
privacy, ownership of information, physician education and engagement, 
transparency, and measurement.199 
Navigenics’ business model does not vary between states and is 
designed to comply with the most stringent requirements currently in 
place.200 Navigenics only offers its genetic analysis services through 
physicians and corporate wellness programs.201 For those patients whose 
physicians do not offer the service, Navigenics provides a list of available 
physicians in a number of states who have integrated the service into their 
practice.202 Physicians are not listed in every state, and Navigenics disclaims 
any apparent endorsement or recommendations of any physician’s 
capabilities.203 Rather than employing a company physician to order tests on 
behalf of customers, Navigenics appears to take much more of a hands-off 
approach, encouraging potential customers to find their own physician who 
is willing to order the test on their behalf. This allows the company to avoid 
any potential violations of physician prescription or informed consent 
requirements. In addition, a disclaimer is present at the bottom of every 
page on Navigenics’ website, “Navigenics does not provide medical advice, 
diagnosis or treatment.”204 The “Frequently Asked Questions Page” 
specifically directs residents of New York to call for more information about 
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reviewers, and with content screened by leading medical institutions or reputable independent 
providers. Id.; Our selection criteria, NAVIGENICS (2012), http://www.navigenics.com/visi 
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ordering,205 and provides a link to special ordering instructions and forms 
for Maryland residents.206 
B. deCODEme 
Iceland-based deCODE received its California Clinical Laboratory 
License in 2009, allowing California residents to purchase its deCODEme 
products.207 Also in 2009, the CLIA-registered laboratory was accredited by 
the College of American Pathologists.208 This accreditation carries deeming 
authority from the CMS, and may help deCODE to meet some state 
certification requirements.209 
Rather than entirely eliminating their DTC service, deCODEme has 
chosen to alter business practices between states when necessary, to comply 
with stricter state laws. The deCODEme Service Agreement acknowledges 
that some states do not permit residents to obtain information from genetic 
scans without the involvement of a qualified healthcare professional.210 
Therefore, unless the scan is ordered under the supervision of a physician 
who provides qualified counseling, certain genetic risk information may be 
omitted for residents of Arizona, California, Connecticut, Georgia, 
Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
and Wyoming.211 It also admits that deCODEme does not have the required 
state laboratory licenses in Maryland and New York, and therefore, their 
services are not available to residents of those states.212 
C. 23andMe 
23andMe participated in the two-day FDA advisory panel meeting in 
March 2011, expressing concern that in the future tests may only be 
available through a physician, and reiterating its founding belief that 
 
 205. NAVIGENICS, Service FAQs, supra note 200. 
 206. Maryland ordering instructions, NAVIGENICS, http://www.navigenics.com/visitor/ 
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completed form to Navigenics Member Services. Id. 
 207. deCODE Receives California Clinical Laboratory License, DECODE GENETICS (Feb. 
19, 2009), http://www.decode.com/news/news.php?story=52. 
 208. deCODE Genotyping Laboratory Receives College of American Pathologists 
Accreditation, DECODE GENETICS (May 20, 2009), http://www.decode.com/news/news. 
php?story=49. 
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individuals have the right to access their own genetic information.213 
23andMe received a license from the California Department of Public 
Health in 2008, allowing them to serve customers in that state.214 23andMe 
does not employ its own genetic counselors, but rather has partnered with 
Informed Medical Decisions, Inc. to offer independent genetic counseling to 
its customers.215 This service is optional, and comes with an additional 
cost.216 
23andMe does not appear to acknowledge state limitations as openly 
on its website as some other personal genetics companies. Buried in the 
Terms of Service is a statement admitting that there are some jurisdictions 
where service is not available because the company lacks the required 
licenses.217 A customer does not learn of many of these restrictions until he 
or she attempts to buy a test kit. Upon trying to ship to New York, a notice 
appears to warn the customer that 23andMe is not able to process samples 
mailed from New York, because of a lack of laboratory license and 
physician involvement.218 However, the customer has the option of having 
the kit shipped to New York, and is required to affirm the sample will not be 
collected in, nor mailed from New York.219 Although it is illegal to spit in a 
test-tube for a DTC genetic test in New York, there is nothing to prevent a 
consumer from going to another state to spit and have the test 
performed.220 Upon trying to ship to Maryland, the pop-up states that 
23andMe is currently unable to offer services in that state, without further 
explanation.221 Upon selecting other restricted states such as California, no 
such notice arises.222 Unlike Navigenics, 23andMe seems intent on 
continuing the direct-to-consumer service as long as possible, until it is 
directly faced with a serious threat of state action. 
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VI.  ANALYSIS 
Ultimately, some standards need to be implemented. Regulation cannot 
be left to the industry itself or to market forces, without first causing some 
amount of irreparable harm. Additionally, companies that are able to meet 
federal standards will gain an air of legitimacy, while those companies who 
are unwilling or unable to meet standards will be filtered out. It may be 
argued that in implementing regulation, the government is being overly 
paternalistic and denying individuals the right to know information about 
their own genetic code.223 However, proponents would counter that 
discovery of genetic information is not being withheld, but rather being 
forced to be filtered through a different pathway. Others may claim that this 
is just another way in which politicians are bending to the will of influential 
physician and health system lobbyists.224 While there may be an element of 
truth to this argument, it does not change the fact that these DTC genetics 
tests are a very powerful tool, and without some form of regulation, there is 
a high likelihood of misuse and abuse. 
A. What Type of Regulations? 
Regulation should occur at the federal level to reduce the cost and 
confusion of complying with multiple state laws. As Mari Baker, chief 
executive of Navigenics stated, “in the end this needs to be regulated at the 
federal level rather than as a patchwork of state regulations.”225 Although a 
small number of states have been successful in enforcing compliance, the 
majority of the states are permitting DTC genetic testing to proceed 
unregulated.226 Some may argue that regulation at the federal level is an 
unwanted intrusion into an area traditionally regulated by states, namely the 
definition of the scope of the practice of medicine.227 However, this would 
be just one more example in a list of attempts by the federal government to 
regulate the practice of medicine, including examples such as the control of 
medical marijuana in California, physician-assisted suicide in Oregon, and 
 
 223. See Support You Right to Access Your Clinical Lab Results, 23ANDME (Nov. 4, 
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results/. 
 224. See, e.g., Daniel MacArthur, American Medical Association: You Can’t Look At 
Your Genome Without Our Supervision, WIRED, Feb. 24, 2011, http://www.wired.com/ 
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 226. GENETICS & PUB. POLICY CTR., supra note 63, at 1-2, 4-5, 7, 10, 12-13. 
 227. Noah, supra note 125, at 149. 
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FDA efforts to restrict distribution of approved pharmaceuticals.228 The 
practicality of a single system and the industry’s calls for a uniform system 
would likely prevail over any federalism concerns. If state actions are failing 
to protect consumers, the federal government should not hesitate to 
interfere.229 
B. Which Tests Should Be Regulated? 
The most practical approach appears to be the one taken by states that 
impose regulations only on certain types of DTC genetic tests. Regulators 
need to make a distinction between those tests that are purely recreational, 
such as those that test for ancestry, eye color, or types of earwax, and those 
that have an impact on medical treatments and decisions. Tests that involve 
risk factors for disease development, reactions to pharmaceuticals, and risks 
of disease inheritance should not be permitted to be marketed directly to 
consumers. These types of tests clearly implicate medical considerations and 
may even be approaching the status of diagnostic and medical devices. The 
risk stratification approach has proved successful before when dealing with 
other direct-to-consumer medical devices such as pregnancy tests, and also 
when dealing with over-the-counter drugs.230 
The Personalized Medicine Coalition distinguishes between medical 
genetic tests that are usually ordered by a healthcare provider and 
informational genetic tests that can be ordered by individual consumers.231 
This distinction is important; however, the coalition’s inclusion of tests meant 
to “gain a better understanding of general health and disease 
susceptibility,” and of tests for risks of diseases such as Alzheimer’s disease, 
diabetes, heart attacks and several types of cancer, in the definition of 
informational genetic tests is overly broad.232 These are the kinds of tests 
that clearly implicate medical decisions. They have an impact on lifestyle 
and future treatment and therefore, should be included in the category of 
tests that are only ordered through physicians or other healthcare providers. 
Genetic tests should be categorized into medical tests and recreational tests. 
Some may argue that drawing a line between medical and recreational 
genetic tests will be difficult if not arbitrary.233 However, these are the types 
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of decisions regularly faced by the FDA and state licensing boards. While 
some tests may fall within a grey area, new laws and regulations can build a 
framework to help decision makers come to reasonable conclusions. For 
example, a factors test could be used to determine if a particular test 
belongs in the medical or recreational category. This test could consider 
things such as whether the results of the test are likely to affect a patient’s 
behavior or lifestyle, have an impact on the course of current or future 
medical treatment, have a strong and lasting emotional effect, or have an 
impact on future reproductive decisions. 
Those in the industry may argue that this kind of risk stratification of tests 
will rob consumers of the convenience of purchasing a single test and using 
a single swab to receive all the answers to their genetic questions at one 
time. While this is true, sacrificing convenience is a small price to pay for 
ensuring consumers are protected. Dividing the industry into medical tests 
with more rigid standards and recreational tests with fewer regulatory 
hurdles may actually be beneficial for the industry. It would open up two 
separate markets, allowing some companies to still market recreational tests 
directly to consumers, while allowing those who wish to target the medical 
sciences a way to continue to provide valuable services. This system will still 
allow consumers the freedom to have their DNA analyzed to satisfy curiosity 
about trivial facts, while protecting them from misleading and complicated 
medical results that can easily be misinterpreted and lead to harmful 
reactions or behaviors. 
C. What Should The Regulations Include? 
Federal regulators should incorporate lessons from those states that 
have successfully managed to impose regulations on the industry. Under the 
traditional idea of using the states as laboratories, there have been 
experiments with various models.234 Following the examples of states such 
as New York, California and Maryland, the federal government should 
create regulations that include a combination of physician prescription, 
laboratory licensing, and informed consent. Regulation of medical genetic 
tests should target both the accuracy and availability of the tests. 
First, genetic tests should be performed in CLIA-certified and state 
licensed laboratories, and should be subject to testing for both analytical 
and clinical validity.235 Regulators could impose their own certification 
standards, or require independent accreditation from organizations such as 
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the College of American Pathologists.236 These kinds of regulations will 
ensure that consumers are receiving high quality tests and the most accurate 
information science can currently provide.237 
Second, medical genetic tests should only be available through a 
physician. Both the AMA and the American Clinical Laboratory Association 
support the need for physician guidance in genetic testing.238 The Federal 
government needs to implement regulations that ensure physicians are 
present to protect consumers from gaps in understanding that can lead to 
damaging consequences.239 Simply mandating DTC genetic test companies 
to disclose volumes of information would only add to the confusion. Rather, 
the regulations should call for a physician, or other qualified intermediary, 
who can provide appropriate counseling and answer questions. In order to 
ensure adequate counseling, communication, and proper administration of 
any informed consent documents, this must be a traditional face-to-face 
doctor patient relationship. Physician employees of the DTC genetic testing 
companies who rubber stamp requests for medical genetic tests should not 
be able to satisfy this requirement. The return of the results through a 
physician also ensures patients are not left to their own devices in 
interpretation, and are given appropriate medical advice regarding the 
consequences. In addition, by filtering the results through a personal 
physician, other factors in disease such as family history, lifestyle, and 
environment can also be taken into consideration.240 
Recommendations from industry should also be incorporated into these 
new regulations. For example, principles from Navigenics’ proposed 
standards are highly relevant to those seeking to construct an effective 
regulatory framework.241 Principles of validity, accuracy, quality, clinical 
relevance, and actionability can be used to help stratify genetic tests and 
determine which belong in the medical or recreational categories.242 
Principles of security, privacy, transparency, and ownership of genetic 
information can shape regulation of the business practices of DTC genetic 
testing companies.243 Incorporating recommendations from the industry not 
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only encourages cooperation and compliance, but also draws upon the 
knowledge of those who know the industry best. 
D. How Should The Regulations Be Enforced? 
The federal government can also learn important lessons on 
enforcement from state experiences. 15 states claim to prohibit DTC genetic 
testing on the books, but very few have actually been successful in 
enforcement.244 Thanks to industry reactions, we now know what methods 
are most effective at bringing DTC genetic testing companies into 
compliance with strict regulations.245 
When faced with non-compliance, recent history has shown that the 
federal government will have to take an active role in enforcement.246 
Clearly banning the industry on the books is not enough.247 Tools such as 
cease and desist letters, threats of substantial civil fines, and negative 
publicity will likely be effective at bringing those errant companies into 
compliance. The FDA may also be able to utilize licensing or an analogous 
stamp of approval to entice companies into compliance. Such a credential 
would give a cooperative company an advantage over competitors, and 
would also reassure potential customers about the quality of the tests. By 
offering both punishment for disobedience and rewards for compliance, the 
federal government should be successful in quickly bringing the DTC 
industry in line with the new regulations. 
E. Other Considerations? 
In addition to the implementation and enforcement of new regulations, 
public education on genetics is essential to arm the population with the 
ability to protect themselves from misleading and fraudulent opportunists. 
Many of those who were the first to order these tests were enthusiasts who 
were well educated in genetics and were able to interpret the results.248 
However, as the tests have become more mainstream, the average 
consumer is less likely to have this level of understanding, and the results of 
the test can cause more harm than good.249 If genetic medicine is truly 
going to become part of everyday healthcare, the general public will need 
to be further educated. When the public has the ability to receive results of 
genetic tests with the appropriate level of skepticism and understanding, 
there will be less reliance on government regulations for protection. 
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However, until public understanding has had the chance to catch up with 
these scientific advances, it is the responsibility of the government to ensure 
this new industry develops in a way that is beneficial and not harmful. In 
addition to public education, the AMA recommends that provider education 
should also become a priority.250 Physicians must be prepared to provide 
interpretation and counseling to patients who present them with results of 
genetic tests.251 The AMA has stated that it is prepared to work together with 
the FDA to ensure physicians are aware of the risks and benefits of DTC 
genetic testing.252 
Additionally, the FDA should work with the Federal Trade Commission 
to monitor advertising practices of the genetic testing industry. Regulations 
should ensure that all relevant information is clearly communicated, 
including both the capabilities and limitations of the tests.253 Similar to other 
consumer protections, these concepts need to be obviously presented, in 
simple language to facilitate understanding by the non-scientific public. 
New developments in science and regulation will likely increase the 
uniformity and quality of genetic tests. On February 29, 2012, the National 
Institutes of Health and CMS launched the Genetic Testing Registry (GTR), 
which could help to reduce concerns about abuses in the industry.254 This 
online registry compiles data on indications for use, validity, and usefulness 
of genetic tests, encouraging transparency in the industry.255 Presently, 
participation in the GTR is voluntary; however if participation rates remain 
low, it may need to become mandatory to remain effective.256 As science 
improves, many of the concerns about DTC genetic testing will likely 
decrease and perhaps, the DTC model can then be revisited. However, at 
the present time, neither science nor the public are ready. 
Critics may claim it is impractical and overly restrictive to impose these 
regulations on the medical genetic testing industry. Since this science is 
rapidly evolving, it may be difficult to constantly screen every algorithm and 
methodology used. A practical approach may be to require approval when 
new traits are added to the screen, and regular reviews of existing tests to 
evaluate them in the light of new scientific discoveries. Critics may also 
claim that the physician prescription requirement will needlessly burden an 
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already strained healthcare system. However, those consumers who currently 
order medical genetic tests directly would likely already discuss the results 
with a family physician, particularly if the results are troubling. Even so, new 
requirements may result in extra visits to the physician for the sole purpose 
of having a genetic test performed. However, like other kinds of new 
technology, eventually these genetic screens will simply become another tool 
available to the general practitioner in the normal care of patients, and may 
even be incorporated into typical physical examinations.257 In the meantime, 
this form of regulation may slightly increase the load of the system; however 
this cost is outweighed by the benefit of reducing the level of stress of 
consumers and the hazards of misinterpretation of results. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Genetic testing has the potential to unlock enormous amounts of 
personalized information that can be used to improve each individual’s 
health. The purpose of regulation should not be to stifle scientific advances 
and technological innovation, but rather to protect naive consumers with 
blind faith in seemingly omniscient entrepreneurs. Regulation needs to occur 
at a uniform federal level, but should incorporate lessons learned from state 
attempts at enforcement and regulation. 
When consumer rights are protected and testing companies are held to 
high standards, everyone will benefit from these exciting scientific advances. 
The genetic testing industry holds enormous promise. Given a balanced 
regulatory framework, it will inevitably play a large role in making future 
medical decisions, encouraging people to take a proactive role in their 
health, and in improving human wellbeing. As long as the industry is 
developed responsibly, genetic testing can soon fulfill its highly touted role 
in improving medicine and the quality of human life. 
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